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Journalistic Codes of Ethics: 
A Proposed Standard for Juries in Libel Trials 
by 
Michael H. Eldridge, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1988 
Major Professor: Dr. Deni Elliott 
Department: Communication 
The standard of judgment for determining fault in tort law 
as applied to libel is ambiguous. Juries are allowed to 
rule against media defendants by using a standard that 
does not consider professional journalistic practice. I 
argue that the determination of professional fault is 
beyond the understanding of a lay jury due to the uni9ue 
professional practice of journalists. Juries find it far 
easier to empathize with private party plaintiffs than 
with media defendants. I abstract criteria from standards 
of conduct for the journalism profession and determine 
what the reasonable journalist might do in general 
practice. In conclusion, I offer suggestions for the 
implementation of these criteria as a solution to the 
current legal dilemma. (61 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There has been a huge increase in libel litigation 
in the United States in the past 
litigation 
few decades. The 
increasing cost of libel to mass media 
defendants produces a chilling effect through self-
censorship. Juries often rule against media defendants 
without considering professional practices uni9ue to 




has been negligent, jurors must have a known 
of measurement for conventional journalistic 
The mere fact 
offense to a publication 
that a plaintiff has taken 
is not sufficient means to 
determine libel. A professional negligence standard 
should be used so the 9uestionable action of the 
the defendant can be better understood by examining 
c ommon pract i ce of others in the defendant's profession. 
Members of the journalism profession have group 
norms which provide the basis for a process of 
understanding responsible behavior. These group norms 
are found in journalism ethics codes that are accepted by 
the profession. 
The selective use of journalism ethics codes can 
be defined as a type of judicial reform. Reforms of this 
type deal with the mechanics of law that are already in 
effect, and do not pose any First Amendment threat. 
Judicial reform also deals directly with the specific 
problem at hand by offering solutions that apply to the 
uni9ue characteristics of libel litigation. 
I believe the adoption of a restatement of 
standards from journalism ethics codes would provide an 
understanding of the professional practices uni9ue to 
journalism. 
The implementation of this approach would lead to 
a more e9uitable manner of determining liability in libel 
litigation. 
Evolution of Libel 
Libel grew from the English law of defamation with 
the rise of the printing press. It was different from 
the older law of slander (spoken defamation) in that a 
written statement is potentially more damaging than a 
spoken one (Nelson & Teeter, 1969). 
Libel is defamation by written or 
printed words, by its embodiment 
in physical form, or by any other 
form of communication which has 
the potentially harmful 9ualities 
characteristic of written or 
printed words. (p. 46) 
In the United States, libel suits were a matter to 
be decided in state courts for nearly two hundred years. 
Legal scholars have recognized the problematic nature of 
libel law for decades. The English law of defamation grew 
in common law with little intervention from legislation 
and was not the product of any specific period of time. 
At the turn o f the century < 1904) , Thomas M. 
wrote: 
Special and peculiar 
circumstances have from time to 
time shaped its varying course. 
The result is that perhaps no 
other branch of the law is as 
open to criticism from its doubts 
and difficulties , its meanings 
and grotesque anomalies. It is, 
as a whole, absurd in theory and 
v ery often mischievous in its 
practical operation. ( as cited in 
Farer, 1987, p . 48) 
Cooley 
Prior to 1964, libel actions were based on strict 
liability, which is the practice of assuming that libel 
has occurred simply because a false and damaging 
statement has been published with no regard to whether or 
not the publisher of the statement acted in a negligent 
o r malicious manner. 
However, in 1964 the U.S. Sup r eme Court decided 
for the first time to consider the defendant's 
intentions, to decide where the burden of proof properly 
lies, and to determine whether all false statements are 
The court ruled in New York Times v. e9ually damaging. 
Su 11 i van < 1964) that the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving falsity of statements, and that falsity alone is 
not e nough to determine libel. Plaintiffs now have to 
show degrees of fault, a restriction that becomes more 
4 
stringent for plaintiffs who thrust themselves into the 
public eye or who do the public's business <Holsinger, 
1987, p. 98-100). 
Mass-media organizations are the 
defendants in the majority of libel cases. In a study 
that involved more than 700 cases over a span of ten 
years, approximately 70% of libel cases studied were 
found to involve members of the news media (Soloski, 
1985, p. 218 > • 
Elements of Libel 
Libel is defamation expressed in print. It is a 
publication in any form which 
reputation. 
is harmful to a person's 
Black (1987) defines libel as 
a false and unprivileged 
publication in writing of 
defamatory material. A maliciously 
written or printed publication 
which tends to blacken a person ' s 
reputation or to expose him to 
public hatred, contempt, or 
ridicule, or to injure him in his 
business or profession. (p. 824) 
For libel to occur, the five elements of libel 
must be present. Each of these elements is necessary, 
but none is sufficient alone. 
Element 1 : Defamation. The statement must be 
false and tend to be injurious to reputation. Please 
5 
note the use of the word ' reputation,' rather than 
'character. ' As Pember < 1981) says, "Your character is 
what y ou are, your reputation is what people think you 
are. Reputation is what the law protects" (p.146). 
A communication is defamatory if 
it tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower 
him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third 
persons from associating or 
dealing with him. The meaning of 
a communication is that which the 
r·ec ip ient 
mistakenly 
understands 
to e:-:p ress. 
correctly, or 
but reasonably, 
that it was intended 
< 81 ac k, p. 375) . 
Element ,., . ..:.. . Identification. The party who 
successfully sues for libel must have been identified 
either directly or indirectly. A phrase such as "a 
highly placed official in local government with ties to 
the psychiatric profession'' may seem innocent enough, but 
in a small town where there are only a few psychiatrists 
and one of them is on the city council, identification 
can easily occur. 
Element 3: Communication. The statement must be 
published or broadcast. This criterion is easier to 
satisfy than it may seem. All that is required for 
communication is that one person other than the subject 
of the communication and the person who initially said or 
wrote the statement see or hear the statement. In cases 
6 
involving mass communication it is sometimes presupposed 
that communication occurs prior to publication because of 
the number of people who read the work or hear the 
broadcast prior to publication. 
Element 4: Fault. A person or organization is at 
f au 1 t if the defamation is communicated through the 
negligence or malice of the publishing or broadcasting 
agent. A distinction between plaintiffs who are public 
officials or public figures is made in determining 
whether the communicator of defamation is at fault. A 
public official or private figure must show that the 
communicator acted with actual malice while private 
individuals need only show that the communicator acted in 
a way that was negligent. For the purposes of determining 
libel, anyone who is not a public official or public 
figure is considered a private individual. In the 
majority of cases, persons who are considered public 
figures are those who have assumed roles of importance in 
society. 
Some occupy positions of such 
persuasive power and influence 
that they are deemed public 
figures for all purposes. More 
commonly, those classed as public 
figures have thrust themselves to 
the forefront of particular 
controversies in order to 
influence the resolution of the 
issues involved. In either 
event, they invite attention and 
comment. (Overbeck, 1985, p. 105) 
7 
Element 5: Proof of damage. Damage occurs if the 
plaintiff can show either that the communicator of 
defamation acted with actual malice or (if the plaintiff 
is a private individual) 
through defamation. 
that actual damage occurred 
Often actual damage is a 
technicality that is satisfied by testimony from the 
plaintiff. A public official, however, has a stronger 
burden of defamation, both malice and actual damage 
(Nelson & Teeter, 1969, p. 107-109). 
If a statement is provably true, then by 
definition it is not libel. Note the word 'provably.' 
"Quoting someone correct 1 y is not enough. The important 
thing is to be able to satisfy a jury that the libelous 
statement is substantially correct" <French, Powel 1 ~~ 
Angione, 1984, p.259). It should be noted that truth is 
the ultimate defense against libel. Even if a defendant 
acts with actual malice in his writing, he cannot be 
successfully sued 
allegations. 
if he can prove the truth of his 
A Chilling Effect 
In spite of the clarity brought to libel decisions 
through the Supreme Court's rulings in New York Times v. 
Sullivan < 1964), juries, judges, and journalists still 
find the elements of libel difficult to apply in specific 
cases. 
8 
The law of libel is confusing and does not allow 
for easy interpretation. This is due to the difficulty 
of balancing freedom of expression and the rights of the 
individual who has been defamed. 
Fear 
reporting 
[The law of 
compound of 
imposed upon 
as rigid and 
found in the 
libel] is a curious 
a strict liability 
innocent defendants, 
extreme as anything 
law, with a blind 
and almost perverse refusal to 
compensate the plaintiff for real 
and very serious harm. (as cited 
in Ferer, 1987, p.48) 
of possible 
strategies of 




pub 1 icat ions. In a recent annual national conference of 
investigative reporters and editors, attorney Sam Klein, 
counsel for the Philadelphia Inquirer, said that libel 
has a chi 11 ing effect on the press: "There certainly is a 
chill. .. in the sense that people have to take second, 
third and fourth looks at stories" (as cited in Stein, 
1 987, p. 10) . Klein also noted that the libel chill is 
felt at newspapers by reporters, editors, publishers, and 
attorneys. 
Media scholars have recognized the huge impact of 
libel litigation on the American press. Wissler cited the 
following problematic areas: 
failure of the courts to address 
the underlying causes or real 
issues involved in conflicts, the 
limited range of remedies that 
are available, high cost and 
delay, the courts' overriding 
concern with procedure, and the 
tendency of adversarial 
interventions to increase 
conflict between the parties . 
... the average time for a case to 
be resolved is four y ears, and 
the average cost in attorney's 
fees for the defendant is 
$90,000. (as cited in Gersh, 
1 987, p. 131) 
9 
Media attorney Henry R. Kaufman has addressed the 
problems of libel litigation and its high cost to media 
organ i::: at ions. 
It is obvious that the threat of 
1 arge awards, the cos ts of 
avoiding or appealing them, and 
the risk that larger awards will 
ultimately be upheld, has raised 
the ante across the board in 
American libel litigation, both 
in terms of the costs of defense 
and in terms of 
settlements 
the value of the 
either the 
· nuisance value ' of the meritless 
claims, or the real value of 
claims with serious potential for 
liability, however infre9uent 
they may be. (1986, p. 547) 
Many of the large institutions that are sued for 
libel have the resources to defend themselves. However, 
small newspapers and television stations do not have the 
advantage of 9ualified in-house legal council to handle 
such problems as they arise. Conse9uently, 
vulnerable to legal attack than are 
they are more 
the large news 
agencies. Many media professionals believe that if 
current trends of litigation continue, only large and 
wealthy press organizations who have the resources of 
10 
capital and insurance will not be discouraged by the 
threat of libel litigation. 
Executive editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer, 
Eugene Roberts, said: 
It is the alternative voices--the 
ones without ample treasuries or 
insurance or sophisticated legal 
help -- that will be stilled: 
smal 1 newspapers, journals of 
opinion, private citizens, public 
interest groups, writers of 
letters to the editors. In 
short, individuals and small news 
organizations that do not have, 
or cannot afford, the protections 
of expensive legal help or of 
1 ibel insurance which, of 
course is growing steadily more 
costly as libel and slander suits 
grow ever more numerous. ( 1985, 
p. 493) 
This fear was confirmed in Green v. Alton 
Telegraph (1982). The newspaper was forced to file 
bankruptcy after being ordered to pay a $9.2 million 
judgment over notes from a story that was never 
published. The case was finally settled for a mere $1.4 
million; the total circulation of the Telegraph at the 
time of the suit was 38,000. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that falsity alone 
does not constitute libel <New York Times v. Sullivan, 
1964; Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 1974) • Yet juries 
continue to hand down multi-million dollar judgments 
without the re9uirement of fault having been satisfied. 
There is good reason to cone lLtde 






Jurors rule against defendants in over 83% of the libel 
cases that go to trial <Franklin, 1 981 , p • 804) • It is 
easy for 
damaging 
jurors to conclude that a false and potentially 
story printed in the local 
themselves would certainly be offensive. 
newspaper about 
Through their 
application of ' reasonableness' from the plaintiff's 
rather than the defendant's point of view, juries are 
saying that falsity is enough to impose fault on a media 
defendant. Jurors seem to gain a certain satisfaction 
from forcing media institutions to pay. 
A lot of people who make up 
juries don ' t like the news media. 
They think reporters are 
chronically careless with the 
facts and cavalier with people 's 
reputations and private lives. 
Lately, many of these jurors have 
been expressing their resentment 
by awarding staggering amounts of 
damages to plaintiffs. (Sanford, 
1 981 , p. 1 ) 
Jonathan Lubell, an attorney involved in 
litigation as council for various plaintiffs, said, 
libel 
"The 
public believes that the media generally look at 
themselves as answerable to nobody, and the public wants 
the media to be answerable II (as cited in Franklin, 
1984, p.273). 
Multi-million dollar awards are not uncommon. In 
F'ring v. Penthouse Int ' l Ltd. (1982) the jury awarded 
1 '") ..:.. 
$1.5 million in compensatory dama9es and S25 million in 
punitive damages for an alle9ed defamation which did not 
even name the plaintiff. A circuit court later set the 
award aside, but the case co st Penthouse over a million 
dollars in legal fees (Overbeck, 1985, p.77). In Burnett 
v..;....a."--"N-'-a~t-=i:....:o::..;n;...:...=;a:....:l'---=E:..:..n.:....g_._L:::1-=i-'-r-'e=..!...r...,_,_--=-I.:....n:....:c=-·=-( 1 98 4 ) a jury awarded the 
plaintiff $1.9 million for the defendant's libelous story 
which stated that Ms. Burnett was intoxicated in a 
restaurant. The Washington Post was ordered to pay over 
$2 million in compensatory and punitive dama9es in 
Tavoulareas v. Washington F'ost Co. (1982). 
In addition to hu9e jury awards, le9al fees can be 
staggering. The defense attorney for CBS in Westmoreland 
v. CBS ( 1985), in which General Wi 11 iam Westmoreland sued 
CBS for $12 million noted that the combined legal fees 
for both sides of the case approached $10 million 
although the case was settled before it reached a jury 
(Boies, 1985, p. 51 ) • 
Methods of Reform 
Concerned legal and media scholars have suggested 
various types of reform in response to libel concerns. 
They have suggested operational reforms, legislative 
reforms, and judicial reformsOperational reforms are 
those which are suggested as methods that news 
or9anizations can use to avoid libel suits. 
13 
Cranberg (1985) suggests 
should be willing to print 
that media organizations 
corrections of false 
statements ( p. 223) . Soloski ( 1985) offers persuasive 
evidence that a concentrated effort in a positive human 
relations campaign would be a major deterrent for the 
filing of libel cases (p.220). Spellman (1985) says that 
if all else fails, news organizations ought to have First 
Amendment insurance as a protection against bankruptcy 
(p.13-15). 
In the area of legislative reform Ferer (1987), in 
her book A Chilling Effect, draws on her experience as a 
lawyer and trial judge to propose a national libel 
statute based on the public's right to know to cure the 
ills of the present system ( p. 342). By giving the 
public a constitutional ' right to know · Farer proposes 
that much of the current libel litigation can be removed 
from the courts through restructured libel defenses and 
clearly defined rights for both defendants and 
plaintiffs. 
Operational reforms describe benefits that would 
undoubtedly help media organizations relate better to 
their readers and story subjects. However, suits will 
still be filed. Legislative reforms posit some 
persuasive arguments, but First Amendment concerns 
regarding the freedom of the press provide major 
stumbling blocks in the paths of these proposals. 
14 
Judicial reform deals with the mechanics of law 
that are already in place, therefore not posing any First 
Amendment threat. Judicial reform also deals directly 
with the problem by offering solutions that apply to the 
specific litigation of libel cases. 
Franklin (1984) and Simon (1984) suggest that the 
determination of fault is a major problem with current 
libel law. They state that juries have a tendency to 
find media defendants at fault without having properly 
considered the standard by which fault should be 
determined. They advocate a standard of professional 
rather than common negligence be used to determine fault 
for media defendants. 
in this course by looking to I continue 
journalistic group norms to provide a process for 
understanding responsible behavior. These group norms 
are already shared by those working as journalists 
producing the news for mass markets. They provide a much 
needed procedure by which jurors can determine the 




COMMON V. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
The reasonable 
1 
person standard is ambiguous for 
the juror and the scholar. When first confronted 
with the phrase 'reasonable person ' a juror might ask "To 
what would the reasonable person take offense?" This is 
the v iew of the plaintiff. Determining to what the 
reasonable person would take offense helps the jurors 
determine defamation and damage. The second way to apply 
the reasonable person standard is to ask "What care would 
the reasonable person take in a given circumstance ·-;:•" 
This is the view of the defendant and used by the juror 
in determining fault. Here I will focus on the 
reasonable person standard as applied to the defendant. 
The · t~easonab le person ' is described 
(Restatement, 1979, Second, Torts, Section 283) 
The reasonable man is a fictitiou s 
person, who is never negligent, and 
whose conduct is always up to 
standard. He is not identified 
with any real person; and in 
particular he is not to be 
identified with members of the 
jury, individually or collectively. 
It is therefore error to instruct 
the jury that the conduct of a 
reasonable man is to be determined 
in 
1 Please note that this chapter contains a extensive 
discussion of a 'reasonable person ' standard. This standard is 
referred to as both ' reasonable person and ' reasonable man 
through the literature. In interest of nonsexist scholarship, 
' person ' rather than man will be used. 
by what they would themselves have 
done. (p. 13) 
Journalists are held 
16 
through common negligence. 
to a standard of judgment 
Libel suits are treated as 
general tort actions. A tort is a civil act and not a 
criminal act. Tort and criminal actions appear to be the 
same in many aspects; however, the burden of proof and 
determination of damages are different. In a tort action 
the party who has sustained an injury is designated as 
the plaintiff and the person charged with committing the 
tort becomes the defendant. The plaintiff is entitled to 
money as compensation for the injury. 
in 
A tort describes a person ' s act 
or their failure to act), when 
there is no right or privilege to 
do so, and such act ( or failure 
to act) injures the person, 
property or reputation of 
another, either directly or 
indirectly. It is a civil wrong 
(e.g., a breach of duty) and not 
a contract violation e.g., (a 
breach of contract). (Webb, 1981, 
p. 1 ) 
The standard of judgment for determining liability 
tort law is the reasonable person standard. The 
reasonable person standard has its roots in common law 
and is a broad category for determining whether a person 
was negligent in their behavior. The Restatement of Torts 
(1979) notes: 
The words II reason ab le man 11 
denote a person exercising those 
9ualities of attention, 
knowledge, intelligence, and 
judgment which society re9uires 
of its members for the protection 
of their own interests and the 
interests of others. 
17 
The standard of the reasonable man recognizes that 
negligence is not congruent with 
a standard of conduct 
the community for the 
of others against 
















of the particular 
(Section 283, p. 12) 
good or bad, 
individual. 
Many states have adopted a common negligence 
standard (Restatement, Second, Torts Section 580B). Also 
see Schrottman v. Barnicle (1982) and Kohn v. West Hawaii 
~T~o~d~a=-<-y~,--=-I~n~c=-=-. (1982). An example of this standard can be 
seen in Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols 
court stated that 
an ordinary negligence standard 
is applicable in libel actions by 
private individuals against media 
defendants. 
In determining whether a media 
defendant is liable to a private 
individual for defamation, the 
conduct of the media is to be 
measured against what a 
reasonably prudent person would 
or would not have done under the 




If the reasonable person standard is used, it is 
only applicable to cases where jurors need no special 
skills or understanding to determine fault. However, a 
professional negligence standard is applicable if 
9uestionable action of the defendant can be better 
understood by looking at the common practice of others in 
the defendant ' s profession. 
In order to accurately determine whether a 
journalist has been negligent in his behavior, a juror 
must be able to articulate what a journalist who was not 
negligent would have done. One cannot measure something 
unless there is some known standard of measurement with 
which to compare it. The mere fact that a plaintiff has 
taken offense to something that has been published is not 
sufficient means to determine libel. We must have a 
standard. 
By way of analogy, if a man took his wife to the 
hospital for routine surgery having been assured no 
problems were anticipated, he would certainly take 
offense if his wife died during the operation. However, 
a jury would not be 9ualified to judge that the surgeon 
had been negligent based solely upon the resources 
provided by their lay experiences. There is no definite 
standard to be found in the law that enables a court to 
determine what is reasonable and prudent in every 
circumstance. 
19 
The following 9uotation is taken from a set of 
federal jury instructions. It illustrates the fact that a 
t'easonab 1 e person standard, formulated for use in 
physical torts, has v ery limited applicability in a libel 
dispute. 
The terms · ordinary care, 
' reasonable prudence,' and such 
like terms, as applied to the 
conduct and affairs of men, have 
a relative significance, and 
cannot be arbitrarily defined. 
What may be deemed ordinary care 
in one case may, under different 
surroundings and circumstances, 
be gross negligence. The policy 
of the law has relegated the 
determination of such 9uestions 
to the jury, under proper 
instructions from the court. 
[author emphasis] (Devitt, 
Blackmar 8~ Wolff, 1987, p.137) 
It is the duty of the court to note the special 
circumstances and events of each case and to make its 
determinations on the particular facts of the case before 
it. If the facts of the case are such that there is room 
for disagreement as to the existence of negligence, the 
matter should be brought before a jury. 
The Supreme Court did not intend that a common 
standard of negligence be applied to libel, as was made 
clear in judicial opinion expressed in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. (1974). Anderson (as cited in Frank 1 in, 1 984 
p.260) offered his opinion 
mentioned in Gertz: 
about the type of negligence 
common 
Few would deny that negligence in 
the physical torts represents a 
very flexible mechanism for 
obtaining the judgment of both 
judge and jury on a specific fact 
situation. But negligence under 
Gertz serves an entirely 
different purpose--the 
preservation of a minimum area of 
"breathing space" for the press--
which it attempts to accomplish 
by freeing publishers and 
broadcasters from liability for 
innocent misstatements. 
20 
Anderson also noted that past experience with 
law negligence has shown that a standard of 
reasonable care would not provide protection from 
unwarranted liability for the media, and therefore would 
not eliminate unnecessary self-censorship. 
Res Ipsa Loguitur 
A legal doctrine comes into play at this point 
which specifically explains the tendency of juries to 
impose liability simply because a thing was published. 
This doctrine is known as res ipsa loguitur 
The thing speaks for itself. 
res ipsa loguitur is rule of 
evidence whereby negligence of the 
alleged wrongdoer may be inferred 
from mere fact that accident 
happened provided character of 
accident and circumstances 
attending it lead reasonably to 
belief that in absence of 
negligence it would not have 
occurred and that thing which 
caused injury is shown to have been 
under management and control of 
alleged wrongdoer. (Black, 1987, 
p. 11 73) 
21 
Res ipsa loguitur is of great concern for media 
defendants. Devitt, et al. (1987) offered the following 
council for judges instructing juries. 
In ordinary cases, the mere fact 
that an accident happens does not 
furnish evidence that it was 
caused by any person ' s 
negligence, and the plaintiff 
must point to some negligent act 
or omission on the part of the 
defendant (p.143). 
The Restatement of the Law (1979) also recognized 
the danger of res ip~a loguitur for media defendants. 
The court should be cautious in 
permitting the doctrine of res 
ipsa loguitur to take the case to 
the jury and permit the jury, on 
the basis of its own lay 
inferences, to decide that the 
defendant must have been 
negligent because it published a 
false and defamatory 
communication. This could 
produce a form of strict 
liability de facto and thus 
circumvent the constitutional 
re9uirement of fault. (Section 
580 B, p.228) 
If jurors are allowed to decide that libel exists 
without appeal to negligence, the Constitutional 
of the defendants are ignored. This judgment was 
articulated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974). 
We hold that, so long as they do 
not impose liability without 
fault, [author emphasis] the 
States may define for themselves 
the appropriate standard of 
liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory 
falsehood injurious to a private 
individual. This approach 
provides a more e9uitable 
boundary between the competing 
concerns involved here. It 
recognizes the strength of the 
legitimate state interest in 
compensating private individuals 
for wrongful injury to 
reputation, yet shields the press 
and broadcast media from the 
rigors of strict liability for 
defamation. [author emphasis] 
(418 U.S. at 347) 
Professional Standards 
Standards which take into consideration the 
with practices of a given profession are dealt 
extensively in a casebook on tort law by Prosser, Wade, & 
Schwartz which notes that litigation 
who provide services is on the rise. 
involving persons 
In cases of this 
sort, the ' reasonable person ' assumes the expertise of 
the professional involved in the case. It is here that 
lay negligence the difference between professional and 
occurs. 
When the person rendering the 
service holds himself out as 
having superior knowledge, 
training and skill, he is held ta 
a standard which expresses this. 
This has been consistently true 
of the traditional professions; 
it has more recently applied to 
the groups newly aspiring to the 
title of professional, and is 
coming to apply ta artisans and 
craftsmen. The standard, 
however, is still expressed in 
objective form-- the knowledge, 
training and skill (or ability 
and competence) of an ordinary 
member of the profession in good 
standing. ( 1982, p.187) 
F'rosset ' , et al. go on to e:-:plain 
professional is usually one who contracts to 
that a 
t·ender 
set·vices, and liability to provide services of a 
professional quality grows out of that contract. 
A 
When the professional is engaged 
in work that is technical in 
nature--not a matter of "common 
knowledge" --a lay jury is not in 
a position to understand without 
explanation the nature of the 
work of the application of the 
standard of care to this work. 
[author emphasis] (1982, p.187) 
plaintiff must provide e: -:pert testimony 
concerning matters which the jury cannot understand. If 
this is not done, the judge has the option of deciding 
that the jury does not have sufficient evidence to make a 
detet·minat ion. In this case, the judge will be obligated 
to direct a verdict for the defendant. 
Professional negligence is synonymous with 
malpractice. Malpractice is a standard for determining 
fault. It is any type of professional misconduct, or 
unreasonable lack of skill in professional duty. Using a 
malpractice approach provides information for lay people 
who do not understand the complexities of professional 
conduct. For example, physicians are often called in as 
expert witnesses to help the jury understand how a 
competent practitioner would handle a difficult techni9ue 
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competent practitioner would handle a difficult techni9ue 
or concept. 'Malpractice' is defined as 
failure of one rendering 
professional services to exercise 
that degree of skill and learning 
commonly applied under all the 
circumstances in the community by 
the average prudent reputable 
member of the profession with the 
result of injury, loss or damage 
to the recipient of those 
services or to those entitled to 
rely upon them. (Black, 1987, 
p.864) 
F'rofessional journalism standards would be 
indicative of the conventional behavior of a professional 
reporter. One of the key re9uirements for an occupation 
to be considered a profession by the le9al c:ommunity iffl 
that some special skill, education, or training be a 
re9uisite for practice of the given vocation. 
The labor and skill involved in a 
profession is predominately 
mental or intellectual, rather 
than physical or manual. The term 
originally contemplated only 
theology, law, medicine, but as 
the applications of science and 
learning are extended to other 
departments and affairs, other 
vocations also receive the name, 
which implies professed 
attainments in special knowledge 
as distinguished from mere skill. 
<B 1 ac k, 1 987, p. 1089) 
There are many similarities between journalism and 
other occupations which are widely 
professions. College programs that teach 
accepted as 
j OLtrna 1 ism and 
graduate programs in journalism and mass communication 
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are becoming more common. However, journalists are not 
required to hold licenses to practice their craft. Under 
the terms of the Constitution, it would be virtually 
impossible to legally require journalists to be licensed. 
Like physicians or attorneys, professional 
have a vernacular and standards of conduct 
journalists 
that are 
specific to their vocation. To quote one legal scholar, 
It is hard to imagine what would 
happen if a jury were charged with 
deciding how an ordinarily prudent 
person would perform an 
appendectomy or conduct a legal 
appeal. Similarly, it is hard to 
imagine that prudent person 
preparing an investigative story. 
(Simon, 1984, p.459) 
An example of the need for jurors to consider the 
uni9ue circumstances and special skills of journalists 
was mentioned in Gobin v. Globe F'ublishing Co. (1975). 
The court noted an applicable standard would be one which 
took into consideration "the conduct of the reasonably 
careful publisher or broadcaster in the community or in 
similar communities under the e:-:isting circumstances" 
(p. 76). 
The Restatement (1979) is in agreement with this 
consideration. It notes that a standard of negligence 
should consider the practices of the 
profession. 
The defendant, if 
disseminator of 
a professional 
news, such as a 
newspaper, magazine, or 
broadcasting station, or employee, 
journalism 
such as reporter, is held to ski 11 
and experience normally possessed 
by members of that profession. 
Customs and practices within the 
profession are relevant in applying 
the negligence standard, which is, 
to a substantial degree, set by the 
profession itself. (Section 580B, 
p.228) 
Standards of conduct which define 
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proper 
conventional behavior "set by the profession itself" are 
e:-:actly what is needed to remove a great deal of 
confusion from libel law. Since no standards have been 
specifically articulated, it is crucial to find correct 
standards of judgment. 
Codes of ethics have been established through 
professional journalism organizations for more than 60 
years. The Code of Ethics of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors (see appendix B) was written in 1923. 
The Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi 
Code of Ethics (see appendix A) was adopted in 1926 and 
revised in 1973 (Goodwin, 1 983, p • 15) . These codes are 
based on a self policing ideal and can provide important 
clues as to the general practice of the journalism 
profession and what is considered to be reasonable 
behavior. In 
for the 
the next chapter, suggestions will be 
offered introduction of data from journalism 
codes that will allow juries to consider specific factors 




DEFINING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
In the previous chapter, I argued that jurors 
ought to determine ' fault ' in libel cases based on a 
standard of professional negligence rather than a 
reasonable person standard. Here I clarify what I mean 
by professional standards for journalists. 
One movement away from using the "reasonable 
person" as a basis for determining journalistic 
neg 1 igence is the use of expert witnesses in libel 
that trials. Expert witnesses are used in tort cases 
involve allegations of professional negligence. An expert 
witness can help jurors understand the subject well 
enough to make an informed decision about the facts of 
the case. Expert testimony, if provided in a particular 
case, must come from individuals who, through the benefit 
of experience, specialized training or education, possess 
specific knowledge which makes them 9ualified 
such testimony. 
An 'expert' may be defined as a 
person who is so 9ualified, 
either by actual experience or 
careful study, as to enable him 
to form a definite opinion of his 
own respecting a division of 
science, branch of art, or 
department of trade about which 
persons having no particular 
training or special study are 
incapable of forming accurate 
opinions or of deducing correct 
to offer 
conclusions. 





is one of a 
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handful of 
journalism professors who serves as an expert witness in 
libel trials. Huttenstine is an assistant professor at 
the University of Alabama who has been serving as an 
e:-:pert witness for 10 years. She appears only for the 
defendant; in the 70 cases in which she has been 
involved, she has been able to convince the jury that due 
c are was used in all but 6 or 7 of them (personal 
communication, June 27-28, 1988) 
Huttenstine uses what is taught at her university 
or what a knowledgeable local reporter would have done 
under similar circumstances as a standard for determining 
whether or not the defendant has used due care. She can ' t 
define 
her test 
'due care outside of a specific situation, but 
is to ask "What care would a reasonable person 
with some professional training take in a given 
situation?" 
Expert witnesses may, from experience, be able to 
say that due care has been exercised in one case, but not 
in another, and not be able to articulate the guidelines 
that form the criteria upon which they are making the 
judgment. This is one of the key reasons for formulation 
of professional negligence standards for journalism. The 
CLlrren t concept of what is 'reasonable ' is hopelessly 
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vague and ambiguous. Mere opinion, even expert opinion, 
must be mated with measurement standards for professional 
conduct. Applicable clarity is only available through 
professional standards. 
In other professions, medicine for example, expert 
witnesses are used in combination with written standards 
so that jurors have an opportunity to understand general 
t' e9 u i rem en ts for responsibility and also how those 
general t'e9u i remen ts are e:-:pressed in a certain 
circumstance. However, medicine and law have a 
set of standards that must be accepted by all 
pt·actitioners. The American Medical Association and 
American Bar Associatioh codes of ethics provide not only 
written statements of practitioners · standards, but also 
provide for punishment for infractions of the codes. 
Jou r nalists form a looser, less accountable 
organization than do other professionals. Licensing or 
strict accountability would interfere with First 
Amendment freedoms. Nevertheless, journalists do share 
group norms and professional values. 
U.S. journalists, 1 ike members of 
every other formal or informal 
group, operate within a set of 
understood conventions that 
govern behavior. Every group, 
from children playing together to 
committees designated to perform 
a certain task, has large 1 y 
unstated expectations of how all 
people within the group should do 
or perform. <Elliott, 1985, p.25) 
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It is because of journalistic shared values or 
group norms that travelers trust newspapers in strange 
U.S. cities. "Travelet's from Boston believe what they 
t'ead in the Buffalo daily and the one in Boise as well 
because all U.S. news organizations share a promise to 
provide accurate accounts" <Elliott, 1986, p.38). 
At this point it should be mentioned that there is 
an ongoing and sometimes hotly contested debate as to 
whether or not journalism is a profession or simply a 
vocation. However, my suggestions concerning journalism 
ethics codes do not impact the professionalism debate. I 
am not advocating licensing for journalism. I simply 
propose that journalists articulate what is already known 
and provide that information to juries. 
Codes of Ethics 
Although journalists do not have one single code 
of ethics, 
They are 
there are major codes that are widely used. 
the codes of The Society of Professional 
Journalists and Association of Newspaper Editors <SPJ and 
ASNE). The ASNE code was adopted in 1923, and the SPJ 
code dates back to 1973 (Goodwin, 1983, p • 14) • I wou 1 d 
like to show how material from these two widely accepted 
codes of ethics can help 
responsible journalist. 
articulate standards for the 
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Codes of ethics are, in many ways, the 
articulation of shared values of the profession. Codes 
of ethics can help jurors understand how a responsible 
journalist would act. However, the codes themselves are a 
bit confusing. Elliott noted, "The SF'J/SDX code 
e: -:emp 1 if ies the usual confusing mi:-: of minimum 
expectations and ideal characteristics in a single 
document" ( 1985, p. 24). 
In recognizing the ambiguity of ethics codes and 
the confusion between minimum and ideal standards of 
behavior, Elliott suggested that the differences between 
conventional and ideal standards be noted. 
Codes necessarily state standards 
of professional practice, but the 
term ' standards ' is i tse 1 f 
ambiguous. · standards of 
professional practice ' can mean 
anything from minimal 
expectations for all 
practitioners to the perceived 
ideal for which practitioners 
should strive. Carefully 
articulated codes of ethics 
should recognize the differences 
between minimal standards and 
standard-as-idea 1. ( 1985, p. 22) 
Ethics codes would be more understandable and 
therefore useful if specific standards for behavior were 
abstracted into understandable categories that would help 
juro~·s understand the behavior of journalists. 
Abstracting some conventional standards fr•om the codes 
gives us a sense of how journalists are generally 
supposed to act. ' Supposed to act ' is a key phrase; the 
codes were written primarily with an idealistic tone. 
Journalists are certain to fall short of some of the 
goals noted in codes of ethics. 
are supposed to seek the truth. 
For e:-:ample, jout~nalists 
WE BELIEVE in public 
enlightenment as the forerunner 
of justice, and in our 
Constitutional role to seek the 
truth a s part of the public ' s 
right to know the truth. <SPJ) 
Realistically, delivering "public enlightenment" 
is beyond the ability of the mortal journalist. 
a lone 
Now, truth is certainly an 
important value for U.S. 
journalists, but the TRUTH of a 
situation is often complex and 
not always attainable prior to 
the day ' s deadline. 
Realistically, journalists often 
pro v ide "facts as we know them" 
while striving for the ideal of 
truth. (Elliott , 1985, p.24) 
From this interpretation we can see why falsity 
is not a nd s ho u ld not constit u te libel. However, 
journalists do strive for the truth through reporting the 
facts as they become known. 
The validity of reporting the facts as they are 
uncovered was supported by the Supreme Court in 
Associated Press v. Walker (1967). The Court understood 
and allowed for journalistic elements that affected a 
story sent over the Associated Press wire. Even though 
there was a factual error in the story, the Court cited 
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mitigating circumstances in its opinion. The Associated 
Press had to contend with deadline pressures when it 
filed the story; the t'eporter on the scene had a 
reputation for being re 1 i ab 1 e, and the story was in 
accordance with the subject ' s previous comments and 
activities (Overbeck, 1985, p.102). 
In Associated Press v. Walker (1967) the press was 
reporting the "facts as we know them" and was vindicated 
by the Supreme Court for doing so. This case illustrates 
the willingness of the judicial system to accept the 
guidelines and natural limitations of journalism. 
Some of the other shared group norms which are 
contained in the ethics codes serve to indicate to jurors 
what a reasonable journalist would do in normal 
practice. For e:-:amp 1 e, reporters are supposed 
their own opinion out of the stories they write. 
Sound practice makes clear 
distinction between news reports 
and expressions of opinion. News 
reports should be free from 
opinion or bias of any kind. 
<ASNE) 
to keep 
The responsible journalist is also supposed to be 
as thorough and accurate as he can be. 
By every consideration of good 
faith a newspaper is constrained 
to be truthful. It is not to be 
excused for lack of thoroughness 
or accuracy within its control, 
or failure to obtain command of 
these essential 9ualities. <ASNE) 
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Journalists are expected to retract or correct 
mistakes which they publish or broadcast. 
It is the privilege, as it is the 
duty, of a newspaper to make 
prompt and complete correction of 




Having illustrated what a professional standard of 
negligence might include, I would like to consider how 
professional negligence would affect the outcome of an 
actual case. 
In Gannett Co. v. Re (1985) the plaintiff, Ronald 
Re, was the inventor of an experimental car that ran on 
compressed air. In a demonstration for the media t1r. Re 
unsuccessfully tried to start the car and resorted to the 
use of jumper cables and push-starting. Finally, after 
approximately 30 minutes, the plaintiff was successful in 
starting the car. It ran at the speed of about ten miles 
an hour and only for approximately one-quarter mile. Two 
years later the plaintiff was indicted on 19 felony and 
misdemeanor counts which involved securities fraud, 
theft, attempted theft, and conspiracy involving another 
invention. 
David L. Preston, a reporter for the defendant 
newspaper publisher, was told to write a story about the 
indictment. In checking the newspaper ' s files Preston 
found two stories that mentioned the demonstration of the 
ai r·-powered car. These stories said that the plaintiff 
had difficulty starting the car, but that it did run. 
F'reston called the attorney general's office and 
discussed the indictment. He then attempted to contact 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff ' s attorney, and an associate 
of the plaintiff, but was unsuccessful in his attempts. 
The subse9uent article which appeared in the News Journal 
the following morning correctly stated the events of the 
indictment, but was erroneous in background information. 
In speaking of the plaintiff and his air-powered car 
demon strati on two years before, the art ic 1 e stated: "He 
displayed a car he said was powered by compressed air. 
The car failed to start, however." (as cited in Gannett 
v. Re, 11 Media Law Reporter, p.2327). 
When the case went to trial, the jury, on the 
basis of the plaintiff's allegations that he suffered 
financial loss due to the false statement in the article 
published by the defendant, awarded 1.3 million 
to the plaintiff. 
dollars 
On appeal, the court found that the plaintiff had 
not shown financial loss and that the false statement 
pub 1 ished by the defendant was insufficient to award 
punitive damages. The court also noted that the amount 
awarded by the jury was so out of proportion that it 
could not be awarded to the plaintiff in good conscience. 
In this case, the jury should have understood that 
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while the statement was false and damaging, the reporter 
was not guilty of professional negligence. The reporter 
had contacted the attorney general's office to verify the 
details of the indictment. 
From the codes, we know that responsible 
journalists should not print damaging information without 
giving the story subject a chance to reply: 
A newspaper should not publish 
unofficial charges affecting 
reputation or moral character 
without opportunity given to the 
accused to be heard; right 
practice demands the giving of 
such opportunity in all cases of 
serious accusation outside 
jud i c i a 1 proceedings. ( ASNE) 
However, the defendant, in good faith, had 
attempted to contact the plaintiff, the plaintiff's 
attorney, and an associate of the plaintiff, and was 
under pressure to produce a story to meet a deadline. If 
the jurors would have considered these factors, then 
they would have been reluctant to hand down an award of 
1.3 million dollars for the plaintiff. 
Gannett Co. v. Re (1985) involved overemphasis on 
an unfortunate turn of phrase. The reporter had written 
"failed to start" when he should have written "difficulty 
in starting." Professional negligence standards should 
include provisions that take deadline pressures into 
account as one of the mitigating factors that affect 
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account as one of the mitigating factors that affect 
journalistic behavior. 
In Associated Press v . Walker (1967) the factors 
contributing to a r' i at were reported by the journalist 
who wrote the story. Retired U.S. Army General Edwin 
Walker was on hand to speak to a group of whites who 
opposed school desegregation. After Walker ' s address the 
group attacked federal marshals who were there to protect 
the first black who had enrolled in the university. The 
Associated Press story that was dispatched very shortly 
after the incident said that Walker led the charge on the 
marshals. Walker denied that he had assumed command of 
the crowd or led a charge against the federal marshals. 
The jury that heard the case awarded $800,000 in punitive 
and compensatory damages to Walker. 
If the jury had had the benefit of professional 
standards, they likely would not have ruled against 
media defendant. The reporting practices of 
the 
the 
Associated Press and its reporter were influenced by the 
circumstances of the events surrounding the story. 
The Restatement (1979) warns that the jury should 
not be permitted 
on the basis of its own lay 
inferences, to decide that the 
defendant must have been 
negligent because it published a 
false and defamatory 
communication. This could 
produce a form of strict 





of fault. (Section 
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Had the jurors understood this principle, the time 
spent and expense of the appeal process could have been 
avoided. Codes of ethics provide important insight that 
could help juries determine when a journalist has acted 
in accordance with group norms or has been in violation 
of them. However, more succinct statements within the 
codes are needed if we expect to provide an 
understandable guide that will help jurors. These 
statements, when combined with applicable factors from 
the law, would provide important insight for jurors in 
determining libel judgments. I will consider a procedure 
for obtaining this information in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
Application of Conventional Standards 
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In searching for a standard of judgment for juries 
to use in determining liability for mass media 
defendants, I advocate a 'restatement' approach. 
legal profession has done this for decades in 
The 
the 
Restatement of the Law. The Restatement is a detailed, 
multi-volume set of books that states the law as it is 
written and provides commentary and examples of how and 
under what circumstances the law is to be applied. This 
process serves to insure against improper interpretation 
of the law. 
In a similar manner, a restatement of the 
conventional behaviors and shared group norms detailed in 
the SPJ and ASNE codes and elsewhere would help jurors 
understand what constitutes professional negligence. 
First, statements of essential shared values and 
group norms need to be collected. These may be from 
codes of ethics and from media practitioners. Input from 
practitioners is vital because shared values exist that 
are not mentioned in the codes. Another valuable source 
of information is case law where a professional 
negligence standard was applied. It is important to know 
what a particular court means in 
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applying this standard. 
Second, the restatements need to be drafted. After 
rough drafts are completed, media professionals and 
journalism educators could check the correctness of the 
material. If the restatements are acceptable to these 
experts, they would have the important benefit of shared 
agreement. 
witnesses 
Input from those who have served as expert 
in libel trials would also be a very important 
contributor to the restatements. 
The restatement of journalism codes has 
applicability in other areas of concern, such as invasion 
of privacy or conduct with sources for stories. However, 
those areas are beyond the scope of the topic at hand. A 
libel restatement should list the factors in the codes 
that are most applicable to libel law. These factors 
should include provisions for accuracy, objectivity, and 
retractions of mistakes. Following the principle of 
restatement, each of these provisions should include 
clearly defined examples of what it means for a reporter 
to truthful and accurate, etc. This could be accomplished 
through the use of hypothetical examples in which the 
journalist acts as a normal, responsible member of the 
journalism profession. 
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Benefits of Conventional Standards 
If juries had clearly articulated standards of 
behavior for media professionals they would be able to 
utilize them in many ways. The most obvious benefit of 
the restatements is their value as a replacement for the 
reasonable person standard, which has been shown to be 
inappropriate. If standards of this type were presented 
to jurors, they would 
' reasonable journalist ' 
be able to determine what a 
is, and under what constraints 
and pressures he is expected to perform. 
As a j udge instructs the jury in a libel trial he 
could provide copies of the restatements to jurors. The 
restatements would serve the two very important functions 
of helping the jury understand how a reasonable 
journalist should have acted under the circumstances of 
the particular case before them and under what pressures 
or mitigating circumstances the journalist was working 
when the events of the case transpired. 
Council for the media defendant, armed with a set 
of standards that are reinforced by restatements to 
facilitate understanding, would be able to explain the 
actions of the defendant in a much more understandable 
way. 
If media institutions had such standards, they 
would be able to explain their procedures and possibly 
avoid libel disputes. Cranberg (1985, p.221) noted the 
majority of persons who sued for libel contacted 
media before they contacted legal council. 
found that 
almost all plaintiffs 
contact the media 
who first 
ask for 
retraction, correction, or 
apology. As would be expected, 
the media reject most of these 
re9uests. It is then that the 





The set of minimum standards would be useful in 
training new employees at media agencies as well as 
students in university journalism programs. By 
familiarizing themselves with these standards, newcomers 
would be aware of the 'taboos of the trade ' and avoid 
costly blunders. 
Finally, if reporters had these standards as a 
reference, then they would be better e9uipped to handle 
their assignments and fulfill their obligations, because 
they would know exactly what is expected of them. 
However, these standards are a two-edged sword; with the 
protection they provide comes a degree of accountability. 
If media defendants have trespassed the standards of 
behavior and have no justification for doing so, they run 
the risk of having those standards used against them in 
court by a plaintiff. 
The media, by articulating standards of essential 
group norms, can show some degree of self-imposed 
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accountability for 
the grain of many 
their actions. This may 90 against 
free-spirited reporters, but the days 
of the cavalier journalist who flaunts his power as a 
watchdog unhindered by law and accountable to no one are 
long gone. "Congress shall make no law ... " still holds 
true, but the general populace is making law abridging 
the freedom of the press. This law is being enforced by 
the rising cost of libel litigation and its subse9uent 
chilling effect on the media's reporting ability. 
It is time for media institutions to articulate 
standards of behavior to be used by juries in determining 
f au 1 t before juries hand down more huge awards. It is far 
more beneficial for the media to articulate their own 
standards of conduct than to have policy dictated to them 
by outside forces that have no knowledge of or 
consideration for professional journalistic behavior. 
44 
REFERENCES 
American jurisprudence. ( 1967). (2nd ed.) 
(Vol.31). Rochester, New York: Lawyers Cooperative 
Publishing Company. 
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S.130 (1967). 
Boies, D. < 1985, May 
' Westmoreland'. 
20). Sorting out the lessons 
Broadcasting pp. 50-52. 
of 
Black, H. (1987). Black's law dictionary 
Paul: West Publishing Co. 
(5th ed.) St. 
Burnett v. National En9uirer, Inc. 465 U.S. 1014 (1984). 
Cranberg, G. (1985). Fanning 
in libel litigation . 
the fire: The media ' s role 
Iowa Law Review, Z.1.., 221-
.-,,-,c:-
..::...::.J. 
Devitt, E.J., Blackmar, C.B., ~< Wolff, M.A. 
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions 
St. Paul: West Publishing Co .. 





( 1985). A conceptual analysis of ethics 
Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 1, (1), 22-
Elliott, D. (1986). Foundations for media responsibility. 
In D. Elliott (editor), Responsible journalism 
( pp. 32-44). Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Ferer, L. G. (1987). A chilling effect. New York: W.W. 
Norton and Co. 
Franklin, M.A. (1981). Suing the media for libel: A 
litigation study. American Bar Foundation Research 
Journal, l, 797-831. 
Franklin, M.A. (1984). What does "negligence" mean in 
defamation cases?.Comm/ent, ~, (2), 259-281. 
French, C.W., Powell, E.A., ~< Angione, H. (Eds.). (1984). 
The Associated Press stylebook and libel manual. 
New York : The Associated Press. 
Gannett Co. v. Re 496 A.2d 553 
Reporter 2327. 
(1985), 11 Media Law 
45 
Gersh, D. (1987, May 2). Resolving libel disputes. Editor 
& Publisher, pp. 96, 131. 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
Gobin v. Globe 531 P.2d 76 (1975). 
Goodwin, H.E. (1983). Groping for ethics in joLwnalism. 
Des Moines: Iowa State University Press. 
Green v. Alton Telegraph, 438 N.E.2d 203 (1982). 
Kohn v. West Hawaii Today. Inc. 656 P.2d 79 (1982). 




< 1 986) , Lib e 1 1 980-85: pram i ses and 
Dickinson Law Review, 90, 545-558. 
Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols 569 S.W.2d 412 (1978). 
Nelson, H. 8~ Teeter, D., Jr. (1969). Law of mass 
communications: Freedom and control of print and 
broadcast media. New York: The Foundation Press. 
New York Times v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Overbeck, W. (1985). Major principles of media law. New 
York: CBS College Publishing. 
Pe m bet~ , D • R • , ( 1 9 8 1 ) M;...:..=a;.:;s"""'s:::;._ _ _;m-'-'-=e-=d:....;1=--· a=-----'l=--a~w. (second ed.) 
Dubu9ue: Wm. C. Brown. 
Pring v. Penthouse International, 695 F.2d 438 (1982). 
Prosser, W.L., Wade, J.W., 
Cases and materials, 
Foundation Press. 
Schwartz V.E. ( 1982) 
(seventh ed.). New 
Torts: 
York: 
Restatement of the law. (1979). (second ed.). <Torts). 
St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers. 
Roberts, E.L., (1985, June 1). Citizen censorship: 
Threats from libel suits. Vital Speeches of the 
Day, pp.490-494. 
San ford , B • W • < 1 9 8 1 ) . ;;;;.s . .. v....:.n..;..;o=---p-=s:....;1=--· s:;;;;._ o; f'---- 't;..;.h.;..e:;;;;._--=l-a_w'-'---=o;..f'--.......;;l-i:;..;;b::;...:::;e-=l---=a-n:....:.=-d 
the right of privacy. New York: Scripps-Howard 
Newspapers. 
46 
Schrottman v. Barnicle 437 N.E.2d 205 (1982) 
Simon, T.F. (1984). Libel as malpractice: 
ethics and the standard of care. 
Review, 53, 449-490. 
News media 
Fordham Law 
Soloski, J. (1985) . The Study and the libel plaintiff: 
Who sues for libel? Iowa Law Review, Zl., 217-220. 
Sp e 1 1 man, R. L. , ( 1 985) . 
News media tort 
Avoiding 
and First 
Communications and the Law. 
the chilling effect: 
Amendment insurance. 
Z., (6), 13-27. 
Stein, M.L. (1987, July 4). The chilling effect. Editor & 
Pub 1 i sher. pp. 10-11. 
Tavoulareas v. 
( 1982) . 
Washington Post Co .. 
Webb, G.H. ( 1981) . Plain language 
Professional Impressions. 
567 F.Supp. 651 
law. Atlanta: 
Westmoreland v. CBS Inc. 601 F.Supp. 66 (1985). 
47 
APPENDICES 
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Delta Chi, Code of Ethics 
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The Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma 
Delta Chi believes the duty of journalists 
the truth. 
is to serve 
We believe the agencies of mass communication are 
carriers of public discussion and information, acting on 
their Constitutional mandate and freedom 
report the facts. 
to learn and 
We believe in public enlightenment as the 
forerunner of justice, and in our Constitutional role to 
seek the truth as part of the public ' s 
truth. 
right to know the 
We believe those responsibilities carry 
obligations that re9uire journalists to perform with 
intelligence, objectivity, accuracy and fairness. 
To these ends, we declare acceptance of the 
standards of practice here set forth: 
RESPONSIBILITY: 
The public ' s right to know of events of public 
importance and interest is the overriding mission of the 
mass media. The purpose of distributing news and 
enlightened opinion is to serve the 9eneral welfare. 
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Journalists who use their professional status as 
representatives of the public for selfish or other 
unworthy motives violate a high trust. 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: 
Freedom of the press is to guarded as an 
inalienable right of the people in a free society. It 
carries with it the freedom and the responsibility to 
discuss, 9uestion and challenge actions and utterances of 
our government and of our 







unpopular opinions and the privilege to agree with the 
majority. 
ETHICS: 
Journalists must be free of obligation to any 
interest other than the public ' s right to know the truth. 
1. Gifts, favors, free travel, special treatment 
or privileges can compromise the integrity of journalists 
and their employers. Nothing of value should be 
accepted. 
2. Secondary employment, 





organizations should be avoided if it compromises the 
integrity of journalists and their employers. 
Journalists and their employers should conduct their 
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personal lives in a manner which protects them from 
conflict of interest, real or apparent. 
responsibilities to the public eye are paramount. 
is the nature of their profession. 
Their 
That 
3. So-called news communications form private 
sources should not be published or broadcast 
substantiation of their claims to news value. 
without 
4. Journalists will seek news that serves the 
public interest, despite the obstacles . They wi 11 make 
constant efforts to assure that the public ' s business is 
conducted in public and that public records are open to 
public inspection. 
5. Journalist ' s acknowledge the newsman ' s ethic of 
protecting confidential sources of information. 
ACCURACY AND OBJECTIVITY: 
Good faith with the pubic is the foundation of all 
worthy journalism. 
1. Truth is our ultimate goal. 
2. Object iv i t y in reporting the news is another 
goal, which serves as the mark of an experienced 
professional. 
which we strive. 
It is a standard of performance toward 
We honor those who achieve it. 
3. There is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of 
thoroughness. 
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4. Newspaper headlines should be fully warranted 
by the contents of the articles they accompany. 
Photographs and telecasts should give an accurate picture 
of an event and not highlight a minor incident out of 
context. 
5. Sound practice makes clear distinction between 
news reports and expressions of opinion. News reports 
should be free of opinion or bias and represent all sides 
of an issue. 
6 . Partisanship in editorial comment which 
knowingly departs from the 
American journalism. 
truth violates the spirit of 
7. Journalists recognize their responsibility for 
offering informed analysis, comment and editorial opinion 
on public events and issues. They accept the obligation 
to present s uch material by individuals whose competence, 
experience, and judgement 9ualify them for it. 
8. Special articles or presentations devoted to 
advocacy or the writer ' s own conclusions and 
interpretations should be labeled as such. 
FAIR PLAY: 
Journalists at all times will show respect for the 
dignity, privacy, rights and well-being of people 









should not communicate 
reputation or moral 
character without giving the accused a chance to reply. 
2. The news media must guard against invading a 
person ' s right to privacy. 
3. The media should not pander to morbid curiosity 
about details of vice and crime. 
4. It is the duty of the news media to make 
complete and prompt corrections of their errors. 
5. Journalists should be accountable to the public 
for their reports and the public should be encouraged to 
voice its grievances against the media. Open dialogue 
with our readers, viewers and listeners should be 
fostered. 
F"LEDGE: 
Journalists should actively censure and try to 
prevent violations of these standards, and they should 
encourage their observance by all newspeople. Adherence 
to this code of ethics is intended to preserve the bond 
of mutual trust and respect between American journalists 
and the American people. 
Adopted 1926, Revised 1973 
Appendix B: Cade of Ethics 
or Canons of Journalism, 
American Society of Newspaper Editors 
The primary function of newspapers is 












trained powers of observation and t'eason i ng. To 







opportunities as a chronicle are indissolubly linked its 
obligations as teacher and interpreter. 
To the end of finding some means of codifying 
sound practice and just aspirations of American 
journalism, these canons are set forth: 
I. 
RESPONSIBILITY The right of a newspaper to 
attract and hold readers is restricted by nothing but 
considerations of public welfare. The use a newspaper 
makes of the share of public attention it gains serves to 
determine its sense of responsibility, which it shares 
with every member if its staff. A journalist who uses 
his power for any selfish or otherwise unworthy purpose 
is faithless to a high trust. 
54 
I I. 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS -- Freedom of the press is to 
be guarded as a vital r ight of mankind. It is the 
un9uestionable right to discuss whatever is not 
explicitly forbidden by law, including the wisdom of any 
restrictive statute. 
I I I. 
INDEPENDENCE Freedom from al 1 obligations 
except that of fidelity to the public interest is v ital. 
1. Promotion of any private interest contrary to 
the general welfare, for whatever reason, is not 
compatible with honest journalism. So-called news 
communications from private sources should not be 
published without public notice of their source or else 
substantiation of their claims to value as news, both in 
form and substance. 
2. F'art i sansh i p, in editorial comment which 
knowingly departs from the truth, does violence to the 
best spirit of American journalism; in the news columns 




SINCERITY, TRUTHFULNESS, ACCURACY Good faith 
with the reader is the foundation of all journalism 
worthy of the name. 
1. By every consideration of good faith a 
newspaper is constrained to be truthful. It is not to be 
excused for lack of thoroughness or accuracy within its 
control, or failure to obtain command of these essential 
9ualities. 
2. Headlines should be fully warranted by the 
contents of the articles they surmount. 
v. 
IMPARTIALITY Sound practice makes clear 
distinction between news reports and expressions of 
opinion. News reports should be free from opinion or 
bias of any kind. 
1. This rule does not apply to so-called special 
articles unmistakably devoted to advocacy or 
characterized by a signature authorizing the writer ' s own 
conclusions and interpretation. 
VI. 
FAIR F"LAY A newspaper should not publish 
unofficial charges affecting t~eputation or moral 
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character without giving the accused the opportunity to 
be heard; practice demands the giving of such 
opportunity in all cases of serious accusations outside 
judicial proceedings. 
1. A newspaper should not invade private rights or 
feeling without sure warrant of public right as 
distinguished from public curiosity. 
2. It is the privilege, as it is the duty, of a 
newspaper to make prompt 
own serious mistakes of 
origin. 
and complete correction of its 
fact or opinion, whatever their 
DECENCY -- A newspaper cannot escape conviction of 
insincerity if while professing high moral purpose it 
supplies incentives to base conduct, such as are to be 
found in details of crime and vice, publication of which 
is not demonstrably for the public good. Lacking 
to enforce its canons the journalism here authority 
represented can but e:-:press the hope that deliberate 
pandering to vicious instincts will encounter effective 
public disapproval or yield to the influence of a 
preponderant professional condemnation. 
